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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890608-CA 
v. : 
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order revoking probation and 
executing the sentence, originally stayed, for burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990), 
in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Scott 
Daniels, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Defendant presents four issues on appeal. However, 
three of those issues presuppose the imposition of probation. On 
July 3, 1990, the trial court, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a), 
corrected the original sentence, judgment, and commitment to 
reflect that the conditions of probation were stayed pending the 
return of defendant from New Mexico, should defendant be 
extradited there. Defendant was extradited, thereby activating 
the stay. Because probation was never imposed, only one issue 
remains on appeal. Did the district court maintain jurisdiction 
over defendant after staying the conditions of his probation? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are 
directly applicable to this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant pled guilty to burglary, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990). 
Defendant was sentenced to a term not to exceed five years in the 
Utah State Prison, which sentence was suspended. Defendant was 
placed on probation, the conditions of which were stayed pending 
defendant's return from New Mexico, should defendant be 
extradited there. Defendant was extradited, returned to Utah and 
was arrested on another charge. Defendant was given a probation 
revocation hearing and was found to have violated his probation. 
He was committed to the Utah State Prison. Defendant was paroled 
from prison and is apparently now living in New Mexico or 
Arizona. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On August 10, 1984, defendant pled guilty to burglary, 
a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) (R. 
13-14). On September 13, 1984, he was sentenced to a term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 17). The trial 
court suspended that sentence and placed defendant on probation 
with the conditions that defendant spend six months in the Salt 
Lake County Jail, pay full restitution and complete an alcohol 
rehabilitation program as set up by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole (AP&P) (Sentencing Hearing (S.H.) 13, R. 17-
18). The probation conditions also were stayed assuming 
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defendant was extradited to New Mexico, until defendant's return 
from New Mexico (S.H. 13; Order, copy of which is attached hereto 
as Addendum A)• An order of release to New Mexico extradition 
authorities was executed on September 17, 1984, and defendant was 
released on October 3, 1984 (R. 19-20). 
On April 17, 1985, AP&P issued an "incident report" 
noting defendant's October 3, 1984 release to New Mexico 
authorities and that defendant had remained in custody in New 
Mexico since that date. The report also stated that it appeared 
that defendant would be released by New Mexico because the 
charges for which he was extradited were to be dropped (R. 23). 
AP&P did not feel that it was advisable to extradite defendant 
but asked that a "Domestic" warrant be issued for defendant's 
2 
arrest should he return to Utah (R. 23). The domestic bench 
warrant with a $25,000 bail was issued on May 1, 1985 (R. 29). 
That bench warrant was recalled on July 22, 1988 (R. 30). On 
On July 3, 1990 the trial court granted the State's motion for 
correction of clerical error, filed pursuant to rule 60(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. There, the State argued that the 
original judgment, sentence and commitment, as executed on 
September 13, 1984, did not accurately record the trial court's 
sentence by failing to reflect the amount of restitution owed, 
that defendant was to complete an alcohol rehabilitation program 
and that the conditions of probation were stayed pending 
extradition proceedings in New Mexico (copy of original judgment, 
sentence and commitment attached hereto as Addendum B). The 
order reflecting the clerical correction was entered on July 26, 
1990, and was effective nunc pro tunc. 
2 
The same incident report requested the recall of a "no bail" 
bench warrant issued on January 14, 1985 following a January 9, 
1985 incident report alleging a probation violation• The 
apparent reason for the request to recall that warrant was that, 
at the time of its issuance, AP&P had not been aware that 
defendant had been extradited to New Mexico. The "no bail" bench 
warrant was recalled on May 1, 1985 (R. 28). 
-3-
August 4, 1988, a "no bail" bench warrant was issued (R. 31). 
AP&P filed an amended affidavit in support of order to 
show cause on October 25, 1988, alleging five probation 
3 
violations. The affidavit alleged that defendant had failed to 
report to AP&P for 40 months; that defendant had failed to make 
restitution payments; that defendant had failed to report to AP&P 
and execute a probation agreement; that defendant had committed 
the offense of forgery on August 8, 1985 in New Mexico and had 
pled guilty to that charge on November 5, 1985; and that 
defendant had committed a burglary on July 2, 1988 in Salt Lake 
City (R. 32-33). On November 11, 1988 the trial court found that 
defendant had violated his probation, revoked the probation, 
reinstated defendant's sentence and committed him to the Utah 
State Prison (R. 44, 57-58). 
On November 15, 1988, defendant filed a motion for 
rehearing (R. 55). On February 16, 1989, defendant was returned 
to New Mexico to stand trial on other charges, and the hearing on 
defendant's motion was held in abeyance pending the outcome of 
the New Mexico proceedings (transcript of hearing on motion for 
rehearing (RT.) 2, 4-5). On September 6, 1989, after defendant's 
return to Utah, a hearing was held on defendant's motion for 
rehearing, and the trial court denied the motion (R. 67, RT. 20). 
On October 21, 1988, AP&P had filed an affidavit in support of 
order to show cause, alleging four probation violations (R. 41-
42). That affidavit did not allege that defendant had committed 
a forgery on August 8, 1985 in New Mexico (allegation #4 in 
amended affidavit). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's appellate points I, II, and IV presuppose 
the imposition of probation and are moot because the trial court 
corrected its original judgment, sentence and commitment to 
reflect that probation was stayed pending defendant's return from 
New Mexico. 
The trial court continuously maintained jurisdiction 
over defendant and should now impose probation in accordance with 
its original order. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S POINTS I, II AND IV HAVE BEEN 
RENDERED MOOT BY THE TRIAL COURT'S CORRECTION 
OF THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND 
COMMITMENT. 
Points I, II and IV of defendant's appellate brief 
address issues pertinent only to the running of a probation term. 
On July 3, 1990, the trial court granted, nunc pro tunc, the 
State's motion to correct clerical errors in the original 
Judgement, Sentence and Commitment, dated September 13, 1984. 
That conviction reflects the fact that probation was stayed 
4 
pending defendant's return from New Mexico. Defendant never 
The position that the State has taken in this matter, and which 
now has been acknowledged as correct by the trial court, is the 
position that defendant himself has steadfastly maintained until 
the filing of his appellate brief. At the February 17, 1989 
abbreviated hearing on defendant's motion for rehearing, 
defendant's counsel stated: 
MR. VALDEZ [defense counsel]: But the last 
sentence [referring to sentencing hearing 
transcript, p.13, paragraph 4] in there 
indicates that conditions [of probation] are 
to be stayed assuming .he is extradited also, 
unless he is returned from New Mexico. I 
don't know what construction we want to give 
-5-
returned from New Mexico to begin his probation term in Utah, and 
that term never commenced. Because defendant was never on 
probation in Utah, any arguments concerning the running of a 
probation term are moot. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED 
DEFENDANT AND CONTINUOUSLY MAINTAINED 
JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues that the trial court indefinitely 
suspended sentence and thereby lost jurisdiction over defendant. 
Defendant relies on In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 (1903), 
to support that assertion. In that case the defendant was 
convicted of forgery. His first sentencing hearing was continued 
4 
Cont. that sentence that may mean — I 
don't know. To me, it means that his 
probation order was stayed. And that perhaps 
at some other point in time this court may 
want to impose a probation order, but I don't 
think one has been imposed at this time. 
(RT. 3-4). 
On September 6, 1989, at the full hearing on defendant's 
motion for rehearing, defense counsel once again reiterated that 
position, as follows: 
It is our position, Your Honor, Mr. Moya 
was never on probation, and although I think 
there is a conflict as between the transcript 
and the actual Commitment and Order that is 
in the file, the Commitment and Order 
indicates there was a probation — 18 months' 
probation instituted through Adult Probation 
and Parole. One thing that is interesting is 
that the transcript doesn't indicate that on 
page 13, I think it indicates this court — 
very last sentence in the paragraph, I 
think — it is the third paragraph, I think 
indicates that this court said the conditions 
-6-
and when he finally appeared for sentencing, the trial court gave 
the following order: 
[I]t is ordered that sentence be, and the 
same is hereby suspended, and the defendant 
permitted to go upon his own recognizance. 
25 Utah at 339, 71 P. at 531. Ten months later, on motion of the 
district attorney, defendant was sentenced and committed to 
prison on the forgery conviction. The Utah Supreme Court 
4 
Cont. of that sentence, "That conditions 
also to be stayed, assuming he is extradited, 
unless he is returned from New Mexico." 
(RT. 6-7). 
I know that probation was stayed and he was 
given, I think depending on what you go on, I 
think he was given a reasonable amount of 
time in order to sign up and sign the 
probation agreement. For the record, there 
was never a probation agreement that was 
signed. There was never any conditions of 
probation that were required by way of a 
probation agreement, which I think would 
entail all the usual conditions of probation, 
such as reporting and that sort of thing. 
And in addition, I don't know whether there 
was ever a written condition that he not 
violate any crimes. 
(RT. 7-8). 
Defendant's original trial counsel, no longer involved in the 
case, also spoke at the September 16th hearing concerning her 
recollection of the sentencing proceedings. She stated: 
MS. MOWER [trial counsel]: . . . At the 
time we appeared before sentencing, I did 
argue to the court that the court should 
place Mr. Moya on probation, flat out 
probation, which would only be served if in 
fact the homicide charges were dismissed. I 
read through and refreshed my recollection as 
to the court's ruling. And what the court 
did was impose a zero to five, if I recall 
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reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that, although a trial 
court had the authority to postpone sentence, it could find 
no rule or principle of law whereby a court 
can indefinitely suspend sentence, keep the 
defendant in a state of suspense and 
uncertainty, and, long after he has been 
discharged from custody, have him rearrested, 
and impose a sentence of either fine or 
imprisonment on him. 
When the court suspended judgment 
indefinitely, and ordered the defendant 
discharged from custody, it no longer had 
jurisdiction over him, and all subsequent 
proceedings in the premises were unauthorized 
4 
Cont. correctly, the fine, stayed 
execution of that sentence and placed Mr. 
Moya on probation on condition that he pay — 
that he pay restitution, on condition that he 
attend an alcohol rehabilitation program. 
The court then stayed execution of the 
probation itself and ordered — well, upon 
the assumption that Mr. Moya would be 
extradited to the state of Utah [sic]. 
My understanding at the time of the 
sentencing was Mr. Moya would not serve any 
probation to the court or to Adult Probation 
and Parole unless one of two things happened: 
number one, he wasn't extradited to the state 
of New Mexico, which in fact he was or when 
he was returned to state of Utah. Subsequent 
to our sentencing hearing, the state of New 
Mexico did process the paper work to 
extradite Mr. Moya. As I recall, we did 
waive extradition and he was returned to the 
state of New Mexico to face the charges. 
(RT. 9-10). 
Finally, in his docketing statement filed with this Court, 
defendant asserts the following fact as being pertinent to the 
appeal: "Defendant was never placed on probation according to 
the transcript records. Therein is an indication that probation 
was suspended. He was therefore unlawfully found in violation 
and committed to the Utah State Prison." Although the State has 
sought, on several different occasions, to reach an accommodation 
incorporating an understanding that probation never commenced, 
appellate counsel has now inexplicably abandoned defendant's 
prior position. 
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by law, and are therefore void. 
25 Utah at 341, 71 P. at 531-32 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, judgment and sentence were 
imposed, unlike the situation in Flint where the imposition of 
judgment and sentence was suspended. There, "suspended" meant 
never imposed. Here, judgment was entered and sentence was 
imposed but suspended in favor of the imposition of probation, 
the execution of which, as noted previously, was stayed pending 
the resolution of charges pending against defendant in New 
Mexico. Defendant was released, not "on his own recognizance," 
as in Flint, but to New Mexico authorities who extradited him to 
that state. When AP&P decided against extraditing defendant back 
to Utah, a warrant was issued for his arrest should he enter this 
state (R. 23, 29). Since neither of the critical indices of 
Flint release of defendant on his own recognizance and 
failure to impose sentence—is present in the instant case, 
Flint's rationale cannot be applied to support defendant's claim 
that the trial court relinquished jurisdiction over defendant. 
The trial court properly imposed sentence and never relinquished 
jurisdiction over defendant. 
However, since the trial court has now acknowledged 
that defendant's probation was stayed pending the resolution of 
matters in New Mexico, defendant should be granted probation 
pursuant to the court's original order. Therefore, his probation 
revocation should be reversed and the matter remanded to the 
trial court for the execution of probation. 
-9-
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's revocation of defendant's probation 
should be reversed. The case should be remanded and, in the 
event that defendant returns to Utah, probation should be 
executed as originally ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ' day of August, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
^-^UDITH S. H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald S. Fujino, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, 




R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON (3982) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : ORDER 
v. s 
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 841908921 
Judge Scott Daniels 
Based on plaintiff's motion for correction of clerical 
error, hearing on the motion and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment 
to the Utah State Prison dated September 13, 1984, is corrected 
nunc pro tunc to read as follows: 
Defendant is granted a stay of the 
sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court under the supervision 
of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of 
Adult Parole for a period of 18 months, said 
conditions of probation to be stayed until 
defendant is returned from New Mexico* 
Defendant is ordered to pay restitution 
in the amount of $700.00. 
Defendant is to enter, participate, and 
complete any alcohol rehabilitation program 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
DATED this day of July, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to Form: 
RONALD FUJINO, 
Attorney for Appellant 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
Third District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Ronald Fujino, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff. ] JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) TO 
vs. > UTAH STATE PRISON 
t/lriMsa> f \ Case No. OR- W-V?^ Qftffcft \A£M 
4 * A / Count No. 
Defendant. C* 
There being no legal or othen^ason why sentence should not be imposed, and defendaothaving been convicted 
Kw n a ii.rv- n thP rnnrt; Cfpiea of guilty; Clplej* of no contest; of the offense of tjLAhC , 
a felony of the
 x v^v*~ degree;, defendant being now present wl court and ready 
for senten^ spp represented by C- * f M D V L L / A J , and the State being represented 
by / » f j V ^ f f ^ r . ^ <* , defendant is now adjudged guilty of the above offense and is now 
sentenced to a terrain the Utah State Prison: 
Judge's 
Initials 
• to. a minimum mandatory term of years and which may be for life. 
L&^not to exceed five years; 
• not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
• not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
• and to pay a fine in the amount of $ 
• and to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of • State, • Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
is/are hereby dismissed. 
B^D< Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of 
Adult Parole for the period of A ^ i r ^ * pursuant to the attached conditions 
of probation. I^J M O S . 
Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County, for delivery to the 
Utah State Prison, Draper, Utah, where defendant shall be confined and imprisoned in 
accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
DATED this 
APPROVED AS.TO FORM: 
^ . • " ' " . .. / 
_/3L__dayof ^ V ^ > ,19 ^T 
COURT JUDGE 
/*—\ Defense Counsel 
V_y O^JL L J . \oio^s^^ H. DIXQN H ,M H. DIXON HINDtEYD . . n 
Deputy Coun(^A<torney _ ^ - * < ^ C L E R K / g e — ot-czt: 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
Judge's 
Initials 
• Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
EJ^Serve fo? ft\fl5- in the Salt Lake County Jail 
commencing 
D Pay a fine in the amount of S D at a rate to be determined by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole; or D at a rate of . 
ET Pay restitution in the amount of S ; or D in an amount to be determined by 
toe Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
B^ tn ter . participate in, and complete any program, counseling, 
or treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
• Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
D Submit to drug testing. 
• Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distributes narcotics or 
drugs. 
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
• Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
• Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
• Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
D Take antabuse D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
• Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
• Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
• Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or • vocational training Das directed by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or with D 
D Participate in and complete any training. 
D as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or with 
D 
D Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with . 
D Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate 
Compact as approved by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service in lieu of days in jail. 
• Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review 
of this sentence. # . ~ 
Q^b< Mr • y n / ,*.,/ gHjrt <ck A (til \J/rr\.L s Xff Kj^iri/ * 
D 
DATED this l ^ day of ^ £ f l T ~ 19 ^ T . 
A I l"c6 jDISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
H. DIXON HINfSSY 
"CLERK Page *£ o f ^ L 
JbL* 
